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The presence of natural resources makes civil conflicts more likely to erupt, 
last longer, and more difficult to end. Yet rebels do not always exploit 
resources wherever they are present. Why? I argue that rebels extract more 
resources when they compete with governments over territorial authority. 
Territorial competition facilitates black market access, generates financial 
pressure, and produces governance incentives for rebels to extract natural 
resources. I test this proposition in a two-tiered research design. First, I show 
globally that moderate territorial control predicts more resource extraction 
by rebels. Subsequently, I focus on the example of ivory poaching which 
offers a rare glimpse into the usually hidden resource extraction process. 
I match spatially disaggregated conflict event data to subnational poaching 
data in conflict-affected African countries. Results show that rebels seeking 
territorial control substantially increase poaching rates. These findings 
highlight the strategic conditions under which territorial competition shapes 
rebel criminal behavior.
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Introduction
When do rebel groups extract natural resources during civil conflicts? An 
extensive literature links rebels’ exploitation of lootable natural resources to 
armed conflict. When insurgents can mine and sell diamonds, profit from 
cocaine processed from coca plants, or harvest and smuggle timber, conflicts 
are more likely to erupt, last longer, and are much more difficult to end.1 
Although precise estimates are difficult to obtain, the protracted conflicts 
these resources help finance kill thousands of civilians and combatants alike 
(Gates et al., 2012). Moreover, resource extraction incurs enormous ecologi-
cal costs, such as toxic contaminants from mining chemicals, large-scale 
deforestation from illegal logging, or population-threatening hunting of high-
value wildlife (Daskin & Pringle, 2018; Gaynor et al., 2016).
Existing research, however, often assumes that when resources are present, 
rebels will exploit these resources when they have an opportunity to do so.2 
Yet rebels do not automatically loot resources over the course of a conflict: 
almost 20% of all rebel groups between 1990 and 2012 initiated or ended at 
least one type of resource extraction over the course of a conflict.3 Why?
I argue that insurgents extract resources as a consequence of their armed 
struggle against a government over territorial authority. When rebels lack ter-
ritorial control, they also lack the necessary market access to start extracting 
resources. Alternatively, without income or civilian support structures gener-
ated at least partially through resource extraction it is difficult for rebels to 
firmly establish territorial control. Instead, it is when rebels actively compete 
with a government to establish political authority over territory that they 
intensify resource extraction.
I identify three mechanisms that drive the link between territorial competi-
tion and resource extraction. First, territorial competition erodes borders and 
undermines law enforcement, enabling easier access to black markets where 
rebels can sell or smuggle illicit goods. Second, rebels who compete with a 
government over territory have organizational pressure to finance increas-
ingly expensive warfare. And third, insurgents seeking political authority 
over territory can use illicit resource extraction as a governance strategy to 
generate civilian cooperation. Together, these mechanisms imply that higher 
levels of territorial competition should lead to more extensive resource 
extraction by rebels.
I test this proposition in a two-tiered research design. In a macro setting, I 
first test my main hypothesis by combining data on rebel groups’ level of ter-
ritorial control with information on rebel funding from natural resources, 
using a global sample of 270 rebel groups between 1989 and 2012 
(Cunningham et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2018). Second, to investigate the 
Haass 1329
proposed causal mechanisms in greater detail, I turn to a micro-level analysis 
of territorial competition and illegal ivory poaching in Africa.
Ivory poaching is uniquely suited for studying the mechanisms of the 
competition-extraction link, since it is a rare type of resource where we have 
direct evidence on the extraction process itself. Resource extraction by rebels 
is usually hidden from outside observers. This makes it extremely difficult to 
empirically test theories that link conflict and resource extraction. To over-
come this challenge, I use an original data source that allows me to capture 
poaching rates directly: the Monitoring of Illegally Killed Elephants (MIKE) 
program under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) that collects annual poaching rates across 
the African continent (CITES, 1999).
I match the spatial extent of MIKE monitoring sites to data on the geo-
graphic location of conflict events from the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010). To distinguish territorial com-
petition from regular battlefield violence, I consider a subset of ACLED 
events, such as territory acquisition or headquarter establishment. I control 
for a wide range of conflict variables as well as site fixed effects to disen-
tangle the competition-extraction relationship from alternative explanations, 
such as battlefield violence and state failure.
Results from both the macro- and micro analysis are consistent with my 
expectation that territorial competition increases rebels’ level of resource 
extraction. I show in the macro-level analysis that rebels across the globe 
engage in more illegal resource exploitation when they hold moderate levels 
of territory. In the micro-level setting, I document evidence that rebels who 
compete with a government over the strategic control of territory increase 
poaching rates by 9% to 36%. Crucially the effect of territorial competition 
events on poaching rates is much stronger than the effect of all conflict events, 
suggesting that the effect is driven by territorial competition instead of general 
instability due to conflict. I also report conditional effects in support of the 
market access, financial, and governance mechanisms specified above.
This paper helps to fill a blind spot of research on civil conflict and lootable 
natural resources. Previous research largely assumes resource endowments are 
exogenously given and proceeds to study the consequences of natural resources 
on civil conflict onset, duration, or termination.4 I relax this assumption by 
endogenizing rebels’ choice to illegally exploit resources. This allows me to 
unpack the causal pathway between resource presence and exploitation. Future 
research on the resources-conflict link needs to take this pathway into account 
to fully understand the conditions under which resources lead to conflict.
This study also contributes to the growing body of research on rebel gov-
ernance in conflict zones (Arjona et al., 2015; Stewart, 2018). My theory, in 
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contrast to existing research that links rebel governance to outcomes such as 
service provision or civilian victimization, sheds light on an underexplored, 
but core function of rebel governance: the conditions under which armed 
nonstate actors engage in criminal behavior, such as illegal resource exploita-
tion. This approach contributes to the literature on how criminal organiza-
tions and different types of crime emerge. To date, this field of research has 
not systematically explored the role of strategic territorial competition 
between rebels and the state (Skaperdas, 2001).
Finally, this study adds to our understanding of the ecological conse-
quences of armed conflict (Gaynor et al., 2016; Hendrix et al., 2016). The 
study’s empirical focus on ivory poaching adds nuance to explanations of 
how human conflict drives the alarming decline of the African elephant popu-
lation—one of the most severe ecology crises on the globe and part of a 
global criminal enterprise in organized illegal wildlife trade that generates 
between US$7 billion and $23 billion in illicit revenue annually (Nellemann 
et al., 2013). Adding to ecological research that documents a close relation-
ship between conflict and poaching (Daskin & Pringle, 2018; Gaynor et al., 
2016), my theory and empirical results highlight that it is primarily the com-
petition between rebels and states over territory that drives the conflict-
poaching relationship.
Research on Resource Exploitation and Rebellion
Studies that link natural resources to civil wars tend to assume that it is the 
presence of resources that increases the likelihood of rebellion and pro-
tracts conflicts.5 Arguments differ, however, about the precise context 
under which resources affect conflict. Some studies suggest that while 
lucrative resources initially increase the risk of violence, very high levels 
of resource income lower conflict risks, as high resource revenues allow 
governments to either buy off or repress potential rebels (Collier et al., 
2009; Fjelde, 2009).
Others argue that particularly lootable resources are most relevant for 
rebellions.6 Lootable resources include minerals, such as gold, alluvial dia-
monds, tungsten, or copper; high-value wildlife, such as ivory or rhino horn; 
plants that can be processed into highly lucrative narcotics, such as coca or 
poppy plants; or even on-shore petroleum or gas fields. In contrast to labor-, 
technology-, and capital-intensive resources, such as off-shore petroleum or 
oil fracking, lootable resources have several desirable features for rebel orga-
nizations: they are highly profitable, require little technological investment, 
and can be easily taxed. Examples include UNITA’s mining and selling of 
diamonds to finance their struggle against the Angolan government and 
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Charles Taylor’s National Patriotric Front of Liberia (NPFL) that mined/har-
vested and sold diamonds, iron, rubber, and timber to fund their fight against 
the Liberian government in the 1990s (Le Billon, 2008).
Common to most of the studies on the resource-conflict link is the assump-
tion that if resources are present, particularly lootable resources, rebels will 
inevitably exploit them. Only a few studies show that insurgents vary their 
resource production for specific types of resources in selected countries, such 
as opium in Afghanistan or oil theft in Syria (Do et al., 2018; Lind et al., 
2013; Ocakli & Scotch, 2017). But neither do rebels automatically extract 
resources when they are present, nor does this hold true for only certain types 
of resources in specific contexts. Figure 1 plots the number of of natural 
resources that selected groups use for financing rebellion. It documents con-
siderable variation in the number of resources across rebels in the same coun-
try and for the same rebel group over time across African, Asian, and even 
European civil conflicts. Given that the plot shows variation within countries, 
where resource endowments remain more or less constant, the variation in 
rebels’ degree of resource extraction is puzzling.
Existing arguments cannot easily explain this puzzle. One explanation 
might be that it is the location of natural resources within a country that drives 
the resource-conflict link, and thus the variation observed in Figure 1. Natural 
resources tend to increase the risk of conflict onset and prolong duration 
when they are located in or close to the areas where fighting is concentrated 
and in settlement areas of marginalized groups (Hunziker & Cederman, 2017; 
Lujala, 2010). Yet, without detailed information on the resource extraction 
volume, a spatial overlap of resource and conflict or marginalized group loca-
tions cannot tell us whether rebel presence is in fact correlated with higher 
resource production.
Another argument is that rebels’ intensity of resource extraction is gov-
erned by the numerous financial and political challenges of organizing war-
fare and controlling contested territory (Weinstein, 2007). Intensified resource 
extraction could be a likely consequence of the strategic decision calculus of 
organizing rebellion. While many studies have explored the consequences of 
territorial control and rebel governance for public goods provision, civilian 
victimization, or effectiveness of rebel administration, research on resource 
production as a function of rebel governance has been largely neglected 
(Mampilly, 2011; Stewart, 2018; Weinstein, 2007).7 In fact, studies on the 
organization of rebellion typically assume that rebel access to resource 
endowments is exogenous, and not a strategic choice by rebels (Lujala, 2010; 
Weinstein, 2007).
In contrast, I argue that resource location matters, but only if it overlaps 
with the territorial and governance interests of rebel groups. Specifically, I 
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show that market opportunities, financial incentives, and governance ambi-
tions that arise from rebels’ strategic territorial interests intensify their 
resource extraction activities.
How Territorial Competition Shapes Natural 
Resource Extraction in Civil Conflicts
I expect that rebel organizations which violently and politically challenge the 
territorial authority of a state will intensify their resource extraction activi-
ties.8 Civil conflicts are, at their core, a competition among organized armed 
groups—typically a government and one or more rebel organizations—over 
the control of territory, defined as variation in “the level of, presence of, and 
access enjoyed by political actors in a given place and time” (Kalyvas, 2006, 
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Figure 1. Varying levels of resource extraction by selected rebel groups.
DRC: MLC = Mouvement de Libération du Congo; RCD = Rassemblement Congolais pour 
la Démocratie. Uganda: ADF = Allied Democratic Forces; LRA = Lord’s Resistance Army. 
Myanmar: KNU = Karen National Union; SSA = Shan State-Army. Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Serbian Republic; APWB = Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. Own graphic based on 
data by Walsh et al. (2018).
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Territorial competition in this sense denotes violent and nonviolent activi-
ties by rebel and government forces to establish physical presence to and 
political authority over the population in a given territory.9 Rebel groups seek 
strategic control over territory to be able to extract resources from this popu-
lation in form of taxes, information, and recruits (Arjona et al., 2015; Kalyvas, 
2006; Stewart, 2018; Weinstein, 2007). Examples include establishing bases 
and governance structures or targeting the other sides’ political physical and 
symbolic institutions.
Rebels’ de facto ability to challenge and, in some cases, even establish 
territorial control varies across and within conflicts, however. The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), for instance, never held systematic territorial con-
trol during the Northern Ireland conflict (Sànchez-Cuenca, 2007). In contrast, 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka established signifi-
cant territorial presence and governance structures for long periods of time 
during its conflict with the Sri Lankan government (Mampilly, 2011). It is 
this variation in degree of territorial control that shapes rebels’ opportunities 
and incentives to engage in and intensify their illicit resource extraction 
through three mechanisms.
1. Market Access. In conflict zones where rebel groups challenge a 
government’s access to territory, they also erode a government’s authority 
to enforce laws. Rebels essentially create an area of “limited statehood,” 
where they can scale up their criminal activities, including illegal resource 
extraction, without having to fear prosecution by the state (Krasner & 
Risse, 2014).
This process creates a dynamic that is similar to the way criminal groups 
in non-civil conflict contexts—cartels, gangs, and mafia-like organiza-
tions—compete with state authorities (or each other) over territory to 
access and control illegal markets (Skaperdas, 2001). By violently chal-
lenging the state’s territorial control or by filling a power vacuum as alter-
native enforcers of property rights such criminal organizations achieve 
access to and control over illicit markets, particularly in locations where 
state institutions are weak and trust is low (Gambetta, 1993; Skaperdas, 
2001). Consequently, in the same way that territorial control enables “tra-
ditional” criminal organizations to access and control markets, rebel 
groups who challenge the territorial control of a state improve their access 
to or even control of illicit markets to which they can smuggle and sell 
illicitly produced resources.
Such institutional erosion not only allows insurgents to intensify their 
own illicit resource extraction, but also facilitates rebels’ connections to 
criminal networks that are necessary to sell products from resources, such as 
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diamonds, gold, or narcotics processed from plants (Lind et al., 2013). 
Particularly important in this erosion process is the bypassing of national 
borders (Salehyan, 2009). Porous borders allow rebels to smuggle illicit 
goods either by themselves or through middle-men. In Angola’s civil war, 
for example, UNITA rebels relied on cross-border smuggling networks to 
turn their physical control over diamond mines into monetary income 
(Global Witness, 1998).
2. Finances. In civil conflicts, rebels’ financial needs scale as a conse-
quence of their attempts to strip away a state’s territorial authority. Insurgents 
must pay salaries, keep infrastructure intact, and acquire new equipment, 
such as weapons and vehicles (Weinstein, 2007). These increasing financial 
demands intensify, in turn, rebels’ dependence on finding lucrative income 
sources. Illicit resource extraction offers one such source. Consider the exam-
ple of the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) involvement in illicit diamond 
mining and trade during Sierra Leone’s civil war. When the RUF captured the 
diamond areas of Kono and Tongo in the country’s northern region, it allowed 
them to exchange diamonds for guns, drugs, and mercenaries (Bangura, 
2000, p. 561).
One consequence of these monetary incentives is that rebels who have 
external financial support have fewer reasons to engage in illicit resource 
extraction. The Taliban’s involvement in the opium trade is an instructive 
example. Opium has long played a large role in financing the Taliban insur-
gency after the NATO invasion. But it was particularly when donations from 
citizens in the Gulf states to the Taliban dried up that the Taliban leadership 
increased its involvement in the opium trade from simply taxing opium pro-
duction to engaging in all aspects of opium production to trade (Moreau, 
2013; Piazza, 2012).
3. Governance. The struggle for territorial control also generates politi-
cal incentives for rebels to engage in resource extraction. Rebels who attempt 
to capture territory require civilian support. Civilian cooperation provides 
rebels with information, political as well as ideological support, tax revenus, 
and/or recruits (Arjona et al., 2015; Kalyvas, 2006; Mampilly, 2011; 
Weinstein, 2007).
Where rebels try to establish territorial control yet have not completely 
succeeded in doing so they can use violence to deter civilians from defection 
or punish them for it retroactively (Kalyvas, 2006). Rebels can and do use 
this violence to coerce civilians to assist in the resource extraction process, 
either by taxing civilian production or through forced labor.
However, violence alone can be ineffective to ensure civilian compliance 
with the insurgents’ rules. Instead, rebels need often at least a modicum of 
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legitimacy among civilians to govern effectively. Including civilians in the 
resource extraction process can be one strategy that complements violence as 
a means of political rule by rebel groups.10 Typically, rebels include civilians 
in resource extraction by allowing or encouraging them to produce raw mate-
rials for illicit goods. This production can take different forms: civilians may 
become coca or poppy farmers, participate in hunting groups (such as for 
ivory), or become part of the work force in artisanal mines. At the same time, 
rebels provide protection to civilians from state authorities. Such a strategy 
allows rebel groups who seek to govern a specific territory to provide civil-
ians with a potentially lucrative source of income, thereby increasing their 
legitimacy vis-á-vis the government in contested areas. The FARC’s involve-
ment in drug manufacturing and trafficking in Colombia exemplifies the pro-
cess of resource extraction as a governance strategy. During their conflict, the 
group repeatedly “defended its practice of promoting coca cultivation and 
then taxing drug farmers for protecting their crops on the grounds that impov-
erished peasants in remote, roadless areas lack alternatives to make a living” 
(Otis, 2014, p. 4).
Empirical Implications
To illustrate that it is particularly territorial competition between a rebel 
group and a state that drives a group’s extraction activities, it is useful to 
compare the mechanisms described above to the two other possible territorial 
conflict scenarios (see Figure 2 above): rebel groups with no territorial con-
trol and groups with firmly established, large areas of territorial control, so-
called “liberated zones” (Kalyvas, 2006).
When an armed group lacks territorial control (cf. the left part of Figure 
2), it is very difficult for the group to construct mines, harvest timber, or 
organize and equip hunting raids. Even though the main advantage of financ-
ing rebellion through natural resources is the minimal technological and 
human effort required to do so, resource extraction still requires at least some 
initial investment and level of organization, such as narcotics processing labs, 
mining equipment, and protection from government forces. If a group is mili-
tarily too weak to physically challenge the government’s authority over terri-
tory, the group’s ability to engage in resource extraction is diminished. 
Moreover, in conflicts where rebels are militarily much weaker than the gov-
ernment, they have tactical incentives not to be pinned down by stationary 
resource production activities (Beardsley et al., 2015). Lack of investment 
and tactical incentives does not mean that those “roving bandit” groups will 
not engage in any any resource extraction. They will still engage in quick and 
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cheap forms of extraction or stealing resources instead of actively engaging 
in establishing extraction systems themselves. Correspondingly, the y-axis in 
Figure 2 starts at “low resource extraction” instead of “no resource 
extraction.”
When a rebel group has firmly established territorial control, in contrast, 
two possible pathways emerge. First, their incentives for resource extraction 
can remain high (see solid line in Figure 2). The incentives and opportunities 
for resource extraction described in the mechanisms above remain in place as 
rebels consolidate their rule, such as ISIS’ harnessing of oil production in Iraq 
(Do et al., 2018).
There is also the possibility that when rebels consolidate their rule their 
resource extraction activities diminish (represented by the dashed line in 
Figure 2). By becoming more state-like, rebel rulers also are more likely to 
diversify their income sources. A group can increase taxation of civilians 
and businesses, becoming closer to being a “stationary” rather than a “rov-
ing” bandit (Olson, 1993). This might reduce rebels’ incentives to engage in 
resource extraction, particularly if they also run into danger of being tar-
geted by international sanctions against their funding sources. These sanc-
tions clash, however, with rebels’ concerns about their international 

























Figure 2. Rebels’ resource extraction as a function of territorial control.
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Ultimately, which of those two routes rebels take once they have estab-
lished control is an empirical question. Without benefiting economically and/
or politically from resource extraction during territorial competition, how-
ever, it is unlikely that rebels can establish “liberated zones” in the first place.
Consequently, the main empirical implication I test below is that we 
should observe particularly intense resource extraction when rebels compete 
with a government over territory.
Macro Analysis: Rebels and Resource Extraction
In a first step, I test this expectation in a macro analysis across 270 rebel 
groups in 71 countries between 1990 and 2011, combining information from 
two data sources. I match information from the Non-state Actor (NSA) data-
set—specifically on the extent to which a non-state armed group had territo-
rial control over the course of a conflict—to data from the Rebel Contraband 
Dataset (RCD) on income sources of rebels between 1989 and 2010 
(Cunningham et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2018). For each group in the NSA 
data I calculate from the RCD dataset the number of illegal extraction of 
natural resources strategies in which the group is engaged. The NSA data set 
distinguishes between “low,” “moderate,” and “high” forms of territorial 
control, allowing me to test the shape of the proposed empirical relationship 
in Figure 2. I use this information to generate a categorical variable Territorial 
Competition where “no control” is the reference category. This procedure 
results in a dataset in 1180 dyad-years as the unit of observation.
Using this data, I estimate OLS models with standard errors clustered by 
country of the following equation:





µ γ Xijt ijt+ 
 (1)
where the indexes refer to rebel group j in country i in year t. I include coun-
try fixed effects mi and year fixed effects γ t to compare variation in rebel 
groups’ level of territorial control and resource extraction within countries 
while controlling for temporal shocks, such as resource prize fluctations. The 
country fixed effects also allow me to control for countries’ (largely) time-
invariant resource endowments as well as other time-invariant differences 
across countries, such as colonial history.
Xijt refers to a vector of country- and conflict/group-level covariates. The 
baseline model includes no covariates; the “conflict controls” model intro-
duces covariates for external military support for government and rebels, 
external political support for government and rebels, rebel strength, as well 
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conflict intensity and incompatibility. The “conflict and country-level con-
trols” model includes the previous covariates and adds basic measures of 
GDP and liberal democracy. See Appendix A.1 for detailed explanation of 
covariate choice, sources, and data structure.
Figure 3 presents a plot of the estimated coefficients for each category of 
the Territorial Competition variable. The plot shows that, consistent with 
my theoretical expectation sketched in Figure 2, moderate territorial con-
trol is associated with approximately 25% more resources crimes in which 
a rebel group engages compared to groups with no control (the reference 
category). This pattern is consistent with my expectation that when groups 
compete with a government over territory (plausibly proxied by the “mod-
erate” control category in the NSA dataset) they also engage in more illegal 
resource extraction. In contrast, when rebels have low levels of territorial 
control, different specifications of Equation 1 converge on a substantively 
small and statistically insignificant effect. Interestingly, we also see almost 
no difference in resource extraction when rebels have established high ter-
ritorial control compared to no control. This lends support to the proposi-
tion that groups’ incentives and opportunities to extract resources become 
weaker once they have firmly established territorial control, possibly due to 
international sanctions.11
Figure 3. Levels of territorial control and illicit extraction of natural resources: 
macro-level analysis.
All models include country and year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals shown. 
Reference category for each coefficient is “no territorial control.” See Appendix C.1 for 
model results.
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While this analysis reveals an empirical pattern that is consistent with my 
theoretical expectation, it remains insufficient for a number of reasons.
First, the RCD data only provides limited information on the level of 
resource extraction. While I circumvent this problem by computing the 
number of different resources rebels extract, this approach has its short-
comings. It masks any differences between groups (and over time) in the 
intensity of resource extraction. When rebels compete over territory they 
might intensify the extraction of one single resource and not diversify the 
different types of resources. Second, a group-level research design cannot 
hold constant differences between the access of rebel groups to a single 
type of resource. To identify an effect of territorial competition, we ideally 
would directly observe competition around resource production sites and 
capture resource output over time.
Most importantly, however, at such a high level of aggregation it is difficult 
to observe the precise mechanisms at play. While it is plausible that the NSA 
variable “moderate territorial control” captures the market access, finance, 
and governance mechanisms, the coarseness of the data and the “moderate 
level of territorial control” measure by the NSA prevent me from testing these 
mechanisms directly at this level of analysis. To address these problems, I turn 
to a micro-level analysis of territorial competition and ivory poaching.
Micro Analysis: Ivory Poaching and Territorial 
Competition in Africa
Ivory poaching offers a unique opportunity to study the relationship between 
territorial competition and resource extraction. First, ivory poaching represents 
a hard case for such a study, since ivory is a less important funding source of 
rebellion relative to other resources. A large number of studies have debunked 
the myth that ivory is “Africa’s White Gold” (Kalron & Crosta, 2013) that fuels 
conflicts on the continent (Haenlein & Smith, 2017; Somerville, 2017; Titeca 
& Edmond, 2019). While rebel groups can and do poach or cooperate with 
poachers, this is often not rebels’ single most important funding source, but one 
among many.12 This assessment is supported by the RCD data, depicted in 
Figure 4. The figure shows that animal crimes—which include ivory poaching, 
but also rhino horn or fur smuggling—rank on position 12 of the most impor-
tant funding sources of rebellion worldwide, behind resources such as opium, 
timber, or gold, but ahead of coltan or coal. It is this relative low importance of 
ivory poaching as funding source for rebellion that makes it a hard case: as 
poaching takes place less often than other forms of resource extraction, it 
becomes harder to detect a link between territorial competition and resource 
extraction in the form of poaching compared to other resources.
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Second, and in contrast to more prominent resources such as opium, tim-
ber, or coca, ivory allows us to capture variation in the resource production 
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Figure 4. Relative importance of rebel group funding sources.
X-axis represents overall count of group-years in which rebels engaged in the respective 
resource crime, 1990–2011. Source: RCD data (Walsh et al., 2018); own calculations.
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conflict zones, since it is demanding to access the production sites, such as 
gold mines, or coca plantations. The enormous number of ecologists who 
study declining elephant population in Africa, combined with international 
efforts to monitor this development, allow us to directly glimpse variation in 
the resource extraction levels of ivory: poaching (Chase et al., 2016; CITES, 
1999). This enables me to hold the level of resource endowments in a loca-
tion constant in order to link resource extraction levels to variation in territo-
rial competition within resource sites.
Finally, poaching also allows me to investigate the theorized mechanisms 
that govern the territorial competition-extraction link. A number of studies, 
for instance, illustrate the links between the market access mechanism and 
poaching. Territorial competition not only allows rebel groups to reach ele-
phant sites more easily, but also facilitates their access to transnational crime 
networks. With their multiple interlinked conflict systems, Central and West 
Africa are among the main poaching hotspots. There is evidence, for instance, 
that the Janjaweed militia “travelled from Darfur through Chad to kill 
between 300 and 600 elephants in Cameroon in 2012.”13 Moreover, in the 
DRC, particularly in the Eastern part of the country where a number of 
national parks are located, local militias collaborate with middle-men to 
transport ivory to trading hubs in Uganda or Kenya (Nellemann et al., 2013).
The DRC also exemplifies how competition over territorial control drives 
rebels’ financial incentives to engage in poaching. Observers note that “[. . .] 
any criminal enterprise operating in the vicinity of an elephant range [in the 
DRC] has a strong incentive to profit from this very lucrative trade, and armed 
groups are best organized and equipped to dominate local poaching” (Vira 
et al., 2014, p. 43). This is because ivory poaching is a highly profitable income 
source. Observers estimate that 1 kg of ivory yields a return of up to $100 in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (one tusk weighs around 3.8 kg).14
Ivory poaching can also be part of a rebel group’s governance strategy. 
Poaching is typically organized in a way that allows for easy taxation. Rebel 
groups often function as “patrons” that fund, equip, and ultimately tax poach-
ing raids, since they typically possess the necessary weaponry and means of 
transportation. Again, poaching in the DRC illustrates this link. A local mili-
tia led by “Colonel President” Thomas—a major elephant poacher near 
Okapi National Park in the DRC—is “reaching out to local populations to 
leverage local discontent, in order to create legitimacy and operating space 
for his force” (Vira et al., 2014, p. 42). Including local civilians in poaching 
operations is appealing for both insurgents and civilians alike, since it offers 
a lucrative income for poor subsistence farmers in conflict-affected areas. In 
addition, rebels also function as middle-men between the actual elephant 
hunters in the bush and their contacts in ivory trading hubs, thus allowing the 
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ivory to move up the value chain (Vira et al., 2014, p. 10). Nevertheless, the 
entry barrier to ivory poaching is relatively low, so that rebels can and do also 
poach themselves, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern DRC’s 
Garama National Park (Somerville, 2017, p. 313; see also Appendix D.1).
Despite this anecdotal evidence consistent with my theoretical expecta-
tions, the link between strategic conflict over territorial control and ivory 
poaching could also be a spurious one, driven for instance by overall conflict 
intensity or differences in ivory availability across sites. To separate out the 
effect of insurgency on ivory poaching from these and other alternative 
explanations, I now turn to a multivariate analysis.
Measuring Poaching Rates
I combine information from the Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants 
program with spatially disaggregated conflict data from the ACLED dataset 
to test my theoretical expectation that higher territorial competition should 
lead to increased levels of resource extraction. CITES established the MIKE 
program in 2002 to track ivory poaching activities in 79 monitoring sites 
across 40 African and Asian countries (CITES, 1999). I use only data from 
MIKE monitoring sites in conflict-affected African countries, covering the 
two African elephant species, the African savannah elephant (Loxodonta afri-
cana) and the African forest elephant (Loxodonta africana cyclotis).
The MIKE data collection process is based on reports by site personnel 
and local law enforcement officials. Site personnel regularly assess the size 
of a park’s elephant population through aerial surveys, foot patrols, dung 
surveys, and information collected by scientists or tourists (CITES, 1999). 
Rangers who discover an elephant carcass within the MIKE site boundaries 
register this information together with the likely cause of the elephants’ death. 
This allows MIKE personnel to report two key numbers for each monitoring 
site at the end of a calendar year: the total number of illegally killed elephants 
illegal carcassesijt_  for site i in country j in year t and the number of naturally 
occurring carcasses, natural carcassesijt_ .
These numbers allow me to construct the standard poaching measure, the 











The PIKE index represents the count of illegally killed elephants divided 
by the number of total elephant carcasses (the sum of illegal and naturally 
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occurring deaths) discovered by MIKE field workers. By including the over-
all number of carcasses in the denominator, the PIKE measure controls for 
natural variation in overall elephant mortality, patrolling intensity, and report-
ing bias (Underwood et al., 2013). The PIKE index is widely used in ecology, 
economics, and criminology to investigate correlates of elephant poaching 
(Hsiang & Sekar, 2016; Underwood et al., 2013). Since PIKE is a proportion, 
it is bound between 0 (= no illegal elephant killings) and 1 (= all documented 
elephant carcasses were illegal deaths). Although MIKE data is available 
from 2002, data collection started late at many sites in that year. This makes 
2002 incomparable to future years. I therefore include PIKE estimates 
between 2003 and 2015, the latest year for which data is publicly available.
Since PIKE is based on carcass counts by local field workers and law 
enforcement officials, the data collection process is not strictly independent 
of conflict events. Higher conflict intensity is likely to limit rangers’ ability 
to collect data on elephant carcasses. This is not necessarily a threat to my 
empirical approach, however. Even though the correlation between conflict 
intensity and poaching measurement introduces bias, this bias should make it 
harder to detect a positive relationship between conflict and poaching rates, 
if poaching rates are systematically lower in cases of high conflict intensity.
Moreover, poaching does not only occur within MIKE monitoring sites, 
but data only exists for these. Data from the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) shows that the known and possible range of 
both African savannah and forest elephants have a much greater extent than 
is captured by the MIKE sites. Using data on the extent of elephant ranges, I 
estimate that MIKE sites only cover about 22.4% of known and possible 
elephant ranges (see Figure 5). Rebels likely also poach outside of MIKE 
monitoring sites, in locations where they know that rangers are unlikely to 
thwart their efforts. In addition, MIKE sites tend to be closer to a country’s 
capital on average than conflict events. As a result, any estimated effect of 
conflict on poaching likely reflects the lower boundary of the true effect.15
Territorial Competition
The main independent variable of interest is Territorial Competition: rebel 
actions that capture the group’s intention to gain political control over a given 
territory. To capture territorial competition within monitoring sites, I match 
the location of conflict events to the spatial extent of the monitoring sites as 
given by a shapefile available from CITES.16
It is not straightforward which types of conflict event plausibly capture 
territorial competition between rebels and government. If civil conflict is 
at its core about the establishment of territorial control, all conflict 
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events—government-rebel battles, one-sided violence, troop movements, 
and others—could be related to an increase in resource extraction. However, 
not all conflict events reflect the posited theoretical mechanisms equally 
well. While battlefield clashes between government and rebels might capture 
the first (opportunity/market access) and second (financial incentives) mech-
anisms, they do not necessarily reflect an actor’s need to establish some form 
Figure 5. Territorial competition events and MIKE elephant observation sites in 
Africa, 2003–2015.
Points represent Territorial Competition events between 2003 and 2015. Transparency was 
added to increase visibility; darker clusters of points indicate a higher number of events. 
Countries with gray shade and dark outline are included in the study sample.
Haass 1345
of basic rule over the territory in question (the third mechanism). In fact, civil 
wars often erupt subnationally in places where the state has more control 
(Koren & Sarbahi, 2018). These places that are, by definition, more difficult 
for insurgents to govern. Consequently, I generate my main independent vari-
able of interest, TerritorialCompetitionijt, from a specific subset of conflict 
event types that plausibly captures rebels’ territorial interests. The ACLED 
conflict data set is uniquely suited for this endeavor. ACLED captures a num-
ber of event types that go beyond battle violence, one-sided violence, or non-
state conflict that is typically captured in other conflict datasets.
I use the following types of ACLED events to create a measure for 
Territorial Competition: (1) headquarters or bases being established by reb-
els; (2) strategic nonviolent activities by rebels, such as recruitment drives or 
troop movements; (3) rebels taking over territory; and (4) one-sided violence 
by rebels. The governance mechanism specified above suggests that insur-
gents have political incentives to perpetrate selective one-sided violence in 
order to establish strategic control by punishing defection in contested terri-
tories. While the nonoccurrence of one-sided violence implies either no or 
alternatively fully established territorial control, the active perpetration of 
such violence captures rebels’ ambitions to establish territorial control where 
they have not yet fully achieved that (Kalyvas, 2006).
The total count of these four event types within a MIKE elephant site per 
year constitutes Territorial Competitionijt .
17 I also generate a count of all 
ACLED events (except riots and protests), the number of fatalities, and the 
number of government/rebel battles in a given site to probe alternative expla-
nations. As any data set that is based on secondary and media sources, 
ACLED potentially suffers from reporting bias (Eck, 2012). To mitigate such 
data quality concerns I systematically ensure that the results are not contin-
gent on event severity or geocoding precision (Weidmann, 2016; see 
Appendix D.9, D.10, and D.11).
Sample
I use the information from ACLED to generate two site-year panel datasets, 
one study data set and one expanded data set. The study data set uses data 
from countries with MIKE sites where there was at least one ACLED event 
in any site between 2003 and 2015 and in which the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program registered a state-based armed conflict in the period between 2003 
and 2015. This results in a panel dataset of 429 site-years across 33 monitor-
ing sites in 13 countries (see Appendix A.2).
The expanded sample includes all countries with MIKE sites where 
there was at least one ACLED event in the country, dropping the 
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restriction that a UCDP armed conflict must have been recorded in the 
country. The expanded sample accounts for the fact that conflict events 
might spill over into countries that are not officially labeled as “conflict-
affected” as their governments are not part of the main incompatibility 
registered by UCDP. Examples include Tanzania, where the conflict from 
the DRC has frequently spilled over through its Western border to the DRC 
(see Figure 5). Yet in these countries, too, competition between rebels and 
the government over territorial control (e.g. rebels seeking to establish 
areas of retreat) could affect poaching.
Unless otherwise noted, all analyses use the narrower study sample as it 
offers more credible comparison groups of conflict-affected and -unaffected 
sites within conflict-affected countries. I replicate the main results using the 
expanded sample in the Appendix D.12 which does not substantially alter the 
results. Appendix B.2 provides summary statistics.
Figure 5 maps Territorial Competition events and MIKE monitoring sites 
on the African continent. We see that territorial competition events often clus-
ter near monitoring sites (solid dark shapes). The correlation between territo-
rial competition and poaching is also visible by joint trends over time and in 
a scatterplot of poaching against territorial competition events displayed in 
the bottom of Figure 5.
Figure 5 also shows that the only country with a substantive elephant pop-
ulation, many territorial competition events, but no MIKE sites is South 
Sudan. This is because South Sudan is not part of the MIKE program. Thus, 
no poaching data exists. Nevertheless, there is substantial anecdotal evidence 
that rebel groups poached during both the South Sudanese independence war 
until 2005 and the Southern Sudanese internal civil war that started in 2013 
(Somerville, 2017, pp. 231–234). Thus, it is unlikely that the theoretical 
mechanisms play out entirely different in South Sudan, even though the 
country is not part of my data set.
Empirical Strategy
To investigate the impact of territorial competition on poaching rates within 
MIKE sites, I estimate an equation of the following form:
PIKE Territorial Competition Xijt ijt i t ijt ijt= 1β µ γ+ + + +   (3)
where the main coefficient of interest is β1, the average predicted increase in 
PIKE for each additional territorial competition event. Equation 3 also 
includes site fixed effects mi. mi controls for site-specific and time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity across sites, including average elephant mortality, 
climate, or time-constant socio-economic conditions. Importantly, poaching 
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is likely to be found in areas of countries with fragile and low-quality institu-
tions. These areas are also more likely to experience conflict (Wig & 
Tollefsen, 2016). The site fixed effects adjust for the degree to which the time 
invariant aspects of local institutional quality confound the results.
Site fixed effects also account for different ivory endowments across sites. 
Rebels’ resource extraction critically depends on the availability and amount 
of such resources in the first place. By holding constant the between-site dif-
ferences in average elephant population (and thus ivory endowments), site 
fixed effects capture this important source of potential bias.
Site fixed effects also control for constant country-level factors, that might 
drive conflict activity between countries, such as political environment and 
economic development. In essence, mi ensures that the model exploits only 
the within-site variation of poaching and conflict events over time, allowing 
the contrasting of sites to their natural comparison units: themselves at an 
different points in time.
The year fixed effects γ t absorb annual global changes in poaching and 
conflict that are common to all monitoring sites. One such global change is 
the one-off legal sale of ivory in 2007 and the change in the global price of it 
that Hsiang and Sekar (2016) find to have driven poaching rates after 2007. 
Other global shocks captured by the year-fixed effects include conflict-
related factors, such as conflict spillovers that affect some countries in the 
same year. By including both site-fixed and year-fixed effects, Equation 3 
essentially represents a difference-in-differences (DiD) specification. In such 
a DiD model, the causal interpretation of β1 hinges on the assumption of par-
allel poaching trends in sites with and without conflict events prior to the 
occurrence of territorial competition. Lag-lead specifications presented in 
Appendix D.3 confirm that this assumption is plausible.
In additional models, I introduce an interaction term between country-
fixed effects and country-specific time trends to Equation 3. This strategy 
allows me to flexibly control for time-varying trends on the country-level that 
simultaneously affect conflict occurrence and poaching rates, such as coun-
try-specific economic growth or population trends. In an alternative approach, 
I replace the country-specific time trends with country-level covariates 
denoted by the vector Xijt . Xijt controls for common causes of conflict and 
poaching rates on the country level, including a measure of the strength of 
liberal democracy (V-Dem), the extent of political corruption (V-Dem), pop-
ulation size, and the national GDP per capita (Coppedge et al., 2015; World 
Bank, 2015a, 2015b).
All models are estimated with ordinary least squares.18 Since residuals ijt  
might be serially correlated within sites over time and spatially correlated 
within countries, I cluster standard errors by country.
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Findings
Main Results
Table 1 presents the main results. Models 1 to 3 introduce site fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and government/rebel battle events in a stepwise manner. 
Model 4 adds country-specific time trends to these models. Model 5 replaces 
country-specific time trends with country-level covariates that capture tem-
poral variation in the institutional and socio-economic environment of the 
conflict. The results are consistent with my theoretical expectation: the coef-
ficient for Territorial Competition is positive and precisely estimated in all 
models. Coefficient size across models is stable and ranges between 0.018 
and 0.024. This means that one additional territorial competition event pre-
dicts an increase in poaching rates between 1.8 and 2.4%. When I replace the 
country-specific time trends with country-level covariates in Model 5, none 
Table 1. Territorial Competition and Poaching Rates.
Dependent variable
 PIKE
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




















Population (log)t−1 −0.669 
(1.440)
GDP/PC (log)t−1 −0.019 
(0.187)
Site fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific trends No No No Yes No
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15
Number of sites 33 33 33 33 33
Observations 429 429 429 429 377
Adjusted R2 .362 .413 .390 .450 .397
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses: *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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of the country-level covariates emerges as a statistically significant predictor 
of PIKE rates in conflict-affected countries. Overall and consistent with theo-
retical expectations, the results from Table 1 suggest that competition over 
territorial control increases resource extraction, as captured by poaching rates 
in MIKE monitoring sites.
To better interpret the substantive size of this effect, Figure 6 plots model 
predictions for different scenarios of territorial competition. The blue/dashed 
point estimates and confidence intervals represent predictions of PIKE rates 
as a function of 5, 10, and 20 territorial competition events, respectively. 
These models predict a corresponding increase between 9 and 36% in PIKE 
rates. Given that the within-site standard deviation of PIKE scores is 0.27 or 
27%, this is a substantively large effect size.
Linking Poaching to Territorial Competition
Do these results really reflect increased poaching activity by rebels as a 
result of their competition over territorial control? There are four pieces 
of evidence that, taken together, make poaching by rebels themselves (or 
their subsidiaries) the most likely explanation for the observed empirical 
patterns.
The first piece of evidence is that all ACLED conflict events predict lower 
poaching rates than only territorial competition events (see Figure 6). Yet, if 
territorial competition simply allows others—such as local civilians and/or 
criminal organizations—to engage in ivory hunting, not only rebel groups, 
we should see the opposite. All ACLED events plausibly reflect higher con-
flict intensity, and thus represent a better breeding ground for all poachers, if 
this explanation is correct. This is not what we observe, however, suggesting 
that it is indeed primarily the competition between rebel groups and govern-
ments over territory that drives poaching rates.
Second, I exploit the fact that ACLED sometimes, albeit rarely, captures 
events that are directly related to poaching. I demonstrate in Appendix D.1 
that the components of the territorial competition variable much better pre-
dict the accidental mentioning of poaching events in the ACLED event 
description than other conflict event types. Thus, territorial competition can 
even predict poaching when measured directly by ACLED itself—even 
though this measurement is noisy and imprecise since ACLED’s purpose is 
not to capture poaching, but conflict.
Third, I summarize case evidence from the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda and the DRC that directly engaged in poaching itself (see Appendix 
D.1). I also sketch the case of the Séléka rebel group in the Central African 
Republic that outsourced poaching to gangs. Crucially, in both cases, the data 
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used for the quantitative analysis reflects key patterns described in the quali-
tative evidence.
Finally, there is suggestive evidence from the macro data that also points to 
a link between territorial competition and poaching. In the final section of 
Appendix D.1, I replicate the macro analysis, but use a dummy whether or not 
a rebel group engaged in animal crimes as dependent variable. The results are 
broadly similar to the results of the macro analysis that uses all resource crimes 
as dependent variable, even though they are not statistically significant due to 
the low number of animal crimes compared to other resource crimes.
Taken together, these four pieces of evidence suggest that is indeed rebel 
groups that poach themselves or outsource poaching as a result of their com-
petition over territory.
Robustness Tests
I consider and test a number of alternative explanations in Appendix D. To 
save space, I explain the logic of these tests in more detail in the respective 
sections of the Appendix and only summarize the results here. Specifically, I 
test for the possibility that rebel territorial competition and poaching is jointly 
determined by (1) prior battle violence, (2) prior levels of poaching, (3) peace 
Figure 6. Substantive effects of different types of conflict events on poaching.
Predictions with 95% confidence intervals based on Model 2 in Table 1 (blue/dashed) that 
includes site and year fixed effects. Red/solid predictions replace Territorial Competition events 
with all ACLED events.
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agreements, (4) peacekeeping deployments, (5) availability of other natural 
resources and resource profitability shocks (including development mea-
sured through night lights); (6) droughts and rainfall shocks; (7) migration 
and IDP flows; (8) choice of unit of observation (MAUP problem), (9) two 
different types of reporting bias, (10) ACLED geocoding precision, or (11) 
sample choice. I also replicate a key null finding on one-sided violence (see 
“Governance” mechanism below) with corresponding data from the UCDP 
GED dataset. Across all models the results remain robust and, more impor-
tantly, substantively similar in size to the main findings.
Exploring Mechanisms
Market Access
The market access mechanism posits that the effect of territorial competition 
on ivory poaching varies according to the institutional context in which the 
conflict takes place, most notably black market access. Greater opportunities 
for rebels to cooperate with organized crime allow for quicker profit turn-
arounds and thus should increase the effect of conflict on poaching.
To test this expectation, I introduce an interaction term between Territorial 
Competition and the V-Dem measure of political corruption. Higher levels of 
corruption should make it easier for rebels to circumvent local law enforce-
ment officials (who might even profit from poaching themselves) and gain 
quicker access to the middle-men who transport ivory on to major trading 
hubs. I therefore expect the marginal effect of poaching to be particularly 
high in countries with high corruption.
Figure 7 confirms this expectation. The plot shows the marginal effect of 
Territorial Competition events at varying levels of V-Dem’s political corrup-
tion measure.19 As linear fixed effects models can be susceptible to biases 
from nonlinearities in the data, I compute and plot marginal effects both 
based on a linear model and a nonlinear kernel estimator (Hainmueller et al., 
2019). Consistent with the expectation that high corruption allows rebels 
easier access to black markets, the plot shows that the marginal effect of 
Territorial Competition becomes positive and statistically significant only at 
high levels of political corruption. In an alternative test in Appendix D.14 I 
also demonstrate that territorial competition particularly increases poaching 
in parks that are close to a state’s border. This finding echoes qualitative evi-
dence that points to porous borders as facilitators of poaching in general (Vira 
& Ewing, 2014). The evidence above suggests that porous borders, and the 
easy access to smuggling routes they provide, also facilitate poaching in the 
context of territorial competition.
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Finances
The finance mechanism implies that insurgent groups with external support 
should poach less. Financial strains of competition with the government over 
territory generate monetary incentives for rebel groups to intensify resource 
extraction. If rebels can rely on external support, for instance by powerful 
states or non-state actors, however, rebels’ financial incentives to extract 
resource should become weaker.
To test this implication, I exploit the ALLY field in the ACLED data. This 
field indicates for each event that the actor responsible for an event had out-
side support. While ACLED does not distinguish between military or non-
military support it is still a useful proxy to test this proposition. I generate a 
count of all events for which ACLED records an ally and interact this count 
with the Territorial Competition variable. The expectation is that the mar-
ginal effect of Territorial Competition is particularly large when rebels have 
few or no outside support.
The marginal effects plotted in Figure 8 are consistent with this proposi-
tion. The plot shows that the marginal effect of Territorial Competition is 
positive and statistically significant only when rebels have no outside spon-
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Figure 7. Territorial competition, Black market access, and poaching.
Bands indicate 90% confidence intervals. Models include site and year fixed effects.
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Competition becomes small, eventually even negative, and statistically insig-
nificant. These results show that external support does not only shape how 
rebel engage in strategic violence (Salehyan et al., 2014; Weinstein, 2007), 
but also rebels’ resource exploitation strategies.
Governance
The governance mechanisms posits that we should observe poaching rates 
to be particularly high when rebels intent to govern a specific piece of 
territory.
Measuring governance intentions during civil conflicts is difficult, how-
ever, since intentions are unobservable. Nevertheless, I disaggregate the 
Territorial Competition variable into its component ACLED event types to 
try to at least approximate governance intentions. I identified two plausible 
pathways for the governance mechanisms: rebels can coerce civilians into 
collaborating in the extraction process or include civilians in the extraction 
process to gain legitimacy.
One-sided Violence and Strategic Developments (e.g. recruitment raids) 
events should be indicative of the first, more violent approach to governance. 
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Figure 8. Territorial competition, financial incentives, and poaching.
Bands indicate 90% confidence intervals. Models include site and year fixed effects.
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second, legitimacy-based approach. Headquarter Establishment indicates 
that at least some form of bureaucratic organization of a headquarter takes 
place, while Transfer of Territory captures the nonviolent acquisition of terri-
tory by rebels, indicating that a transfer of political authority takes place.
Figure 9 supports the latter theoretical expectation. The plot shows the 
coefficients of regressing PIKE rates on different components of the 
Territorial Competition variable. Consistent with the expectation that gover-
nance incentives drive resource extraction, the coefficients are largest for the 
Headquarter Establishment and Transfer of Territory variables.
Conclusion
When do rebels extract natural resource in civil conflicts? I argue that rebels 
have particularly strong incentives to extract natural resources when they are 
actively competing with a government over territorial authority. I test this 
argument in a two-part research design. In a macro-level analysis, I show that 
rebels group with moderate levels of territorial controls engage in a larger 
number of resource crimes. In a micro-level analysis, I match geo-referenced 
conflict event data to geographically disaggregated information on a conflict 
resource where we have unique evidence of its extraction patterns: ivory 
poaching. Results from fixed-effects specifications provide robust support 
for my core hypothesis: ivory poaching is particularly prevalent in contexts 
where territory is actively contested. I also document supporting quantitative 
and anecdotal qualitative evidence for the market access, financial, 
Figure 9. Territorial competition, governance, and poaching.
Thin/solid lines indicate 95%/90% confidence intervals. All models include a control for the 
overall number of ACLED events.
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and governance mechanisms that drive this pattern. The fact that a similar 
empirical pattern emerges in both the macro- and the micro-level analysis 
highlights the robustness of the results.
One key implication of this study pertains to the notion of a resource 
“curse” in civil conflicts. In contrast to the assumption of an exogenous curse 
of resource presence that permeates the literature, the theoretical argument 
advanced here endogenizes the choice of insurgents to extract resources. It 
highlights the market, financial, and governance conditions under which 
insurgents are most likely to mine, log, or hunt lootable resources to finance 
warfare. Future research that links resource presence to conflict onset or 
duration might benefit from taking these conditions into account.
This article also generates new avenues for the research program on rebel 
governance. Variation in the institutions created by rebel organizations can 
influence a wide range of outcomes, including public good provision, post-
conflict democratization, or civilian victimization during civil wars. Building 
on the insights from this resesarch program, I demonstrate the close relation-
ship between governance incentives and resource extraction. Possible exten-
sions of the analysis presented here could further investigate why, as suggested 
by the results of the macro analysis, rebels with high territorial control seem to 
engage in less resource crimes than rebels with moderate territorial control.
Finally, this study helps to advance our understanding about ecological 
consequences of conflict. It provides a theoretical micro-foundation and 
delivers robust empirical evidence to inform a critical policy debate that 
seeks to address one of the most pressing ecology crises in Africa: the poten-
tial extinction of the continent’s elephant population (Nellemann et al., 2013). 
While I show, consistent with existing research, that conflict drives poaching 
rates, it is particularly competition over territory that increases poaching rates 
during conflicts. This finding could help to anticipate rebel behavior to better 
protect wildlife in conflict.
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Notes
 1. See e.g. Conrad et al. (2019), Fearon (2004), Felbab-Brown (2009), Le Billon 
(2001), Lujala (2010), Ross (2015), Snyder (2006), Walsh et al. (2018).
 2. Some studies focus more on shifts in the value of a resource, instead of only 
resource presence (see e.g. Dube & Vargas, 2013), but nevertheless assume that 
resource exploitation is a direct function of resource value.
 3. Calculation based on data by Walsh et al. (2018); see also Figure 1.
 4. See e.g. Conrad et al. (2019), Le Billon (2001), Lujala (2010), Lujala et al. 
(2005), Piazza (2012), Ross (2006, 2015), Rustad and Binningsbø (2012), Walsh 
et al. (2018), Weinstein (2007).
 5. For a comprehensive overview of the resource-conflict link, see Ross (2015) and 
Koubi et al. (2014).
 6. See e.g. Fearon (2004), Lujala (2010), Lujala et al. (2005), Ross (2006), Walsh 
et al. (2018).
 7. Exceptions include the aforementioned studies on oil production by ISIS, see Do 
et al. (2018), Ocakli and Scotch (2017).
 8. Rebel groups are “armed organizations that fight against a government in an 
internal armed conflict in order advance their political and/or military agenda,” 
Jo (2015, p. 8). I use the terms “rebel groups,” “rebel organizations,” and “insur-
gents” interchangeably.
 9. For a similar conceptualization of territorial competition, see Kalyvas (2006).
10. The selective provision of public goods is another such strategy (Stewart, 2018).
11. In Appendix C.2, I also test the possibility that rebel groups with high territorial 
control might be able to rely more strongly on remittances, which would reduce 
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their incentives to engage in resource extraction. I do not find any evidence con-
sistent with that idea.
12. While rebellion is one important driver of poaching (Daskin & Pringle, 2018), it 
is not the single most important one. Other factors include growing ivory mar-
kets in China, weak local governance in many African states, and endemic local 
poverty. See Hsiang and Sekar (2016), Nellemann et al. (2013), Underwood 
et al. (2013).
13. Nellemann et al. (2013, p. 58). See also Vira and Ewing (2014, p. 8).
14. See Vira and Ewing (2014, p. 18). Figures on ivory prices are only rough esti-
mates as they vary considerably in response to demand and international market 
price fluctuations.
15. Rangers’ monitoring activities in MIKE sites might be positively related to the 
reporting of conflict events. I address this concern in the Appendix D.10.
16. To address the possibility of a modifiable area unit problem (MAUP) stemming 
from the spatial shape of the MIKE sites, I construct alternative units of obser-
vation based on geodesic circles around park centroids as well as on different 
buffer sizes around park shapes. The results remain substantively unaffected. See 
Appendix D.11.
17. In Appendix D.2, I also compute the territorial competition variable as a) share 
of all events, b) as a logged count, and c) a categorical variable. Replicating the 
analysis with these versions does not lead to substantively different results. For 
easier interpretation I therefore use the count variable.
18. Even though PIKE is a proportion that is bounded between 0 and 1, residual 
analysis confirms that ijt  is homoscedastic and essentially normally distributed 
after removing site specific averages through site fixed effects. See Hsiang and 
Sekar (2016, p. 42ff.) for similar results.
19. I removed the Akagera park in Rwanda as an extreme outlier in the V-Dem 
corruption data to facilitate plotting. Substantive results are unchanged when 
Akagera is included.
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